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This paper addresses the determinants of interest rates in the Brazilian 
banking market. The results suggest that banks fully adjust their loan 
interest rates to a change in the monetary policy rate, but we also observe a 
rigid short-term response for some loan product categories. The study 
confirms that pricing policies can vary substantially depending on the 
market. For example, microeconomic factors did not seem to be a major 
determinant of retail loan  rates, but they were found to be important 
determinants of corporate loan or time deposit rates. As two additional 
results, market concentration was found to have a robust significant positive 
effect on loan rates and interest spreads, as well as the international risk 
perception of Brazil, as proxied by the EMBI Brazil. 
 
Keywords: Interest Rates, Bank Spread, Brazilian Banks. 
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31 Introduction 
 
This paper examines the micro and macroeconomic determinants of bank 
interest rates in Brazil. The relevance of this issue stems from the fact there can be real 
effects on consumption and investment when bank prices are modified, even when there 
are no changes in the volume of credit. Besides this, knowing the behavior of bank 
interest rates is relevant to the conduct of monetary policy. As Brazil has the largest 
banking system in Latin America, and the credit market has been by far the most 
important source of financing to individuals and firms
3
 
, identifying the factors driving 
these interest rates is an important exercise. 
The  paper  focuses  on the three most important banking market segments – 
corporate and retail loans and funding –  using bank level data. Since  there are 
differences in the evolution of corporate and retail loan interest rates (see Figure 1), a 
better knowledge of these differences is relevant for policy purposes.   
 
In this study, we analyze the interest rate channel of monetary policy 
transmission for five loan products. Following much of the research in the literature on 
the pass-through from policy rates to bank interest rates, we test the so-called 
completeness hypothesis, i.e., the one-for-one effect of the policy rate on bank rates.  
 
Measurement of the pass-through is important to assess the efficiency of 
monetary policy. But the scope of this paper is wider, and here we also investigate 
bank-specific factors that drive the heterogeneity in bank pricing policies. To do this, 
we focus on two particular pricing measures: the interest spread and a consolidated 
measure of interest rate per bank. In particular, we consider the effects on deposit and 
loan interest rates of control variables such as bank liquidity, as we expect that it acts as 
a buffer against market fluctuations, or bank capitalization, since financial institutions 
have to keep regulatory capital against risk-weighted assets, implying that their capital 
adequacy influences their lending. The analysis also controls for bank efficiency, size, 
inflation, economic activity, non-performing loans, international risk perception of 
3 As an example, from 2002 to 2010, the funding issues in the capital market were equivalent to only 
about 4% of the total new credit transactions. 
4Brazil and the volatility of monetary policy. By considering all these controls, this paper 
adds to the existing literature using Brazilian data. 
 
Another important determinant of bank  pricing behavior is the degree of 
concentration in the financial system. Berger (1995) states that a bank with a large 
market share may be able to set interest rates oligopolistically. Here we assume that the 
degree of market concentration is a proxy for market power, and our results show a 
positive effect of market concentration on the  bank spread and loan interest rates, 
corroborating the relative market power hypothesis presented by Berger. This result is 
new for the Brazilian case. 
 
Following this introduction, Section 2 presents some facts regarding the 
evolution of interest rates in Brazil. Section 3 briefly  reviews the literature on the 
determinants of bank interest rates. Section 4 presents the data and Section 5 discusses 
the estimated model and results. Section 6 concludes the text. 
 
2 Some aspects concerning bank interest rates in Brazil 
 
Before presenting the determinants of bank interest rates, it is important  to 
describe its evolution and some institutional characteristics that may influence bank 
pricing policies in Brazil. Over the past decade, following a reduction in the monetary 
policy rate, there has been a fall in the average bank rates as well as in interest spreads, 
as can be seen in Figure 1.  
 
During this period, many factors contributed to the reduction of bank interest 
rates, such as the decrease in the inflation rate, which diminished from 12.5% in 2002 to 
5.9% in 2010. Besides, as presented by Banco Central do Brasil (2010), new borrowers 
with low risk profile joined the credit market, increasing the loan portfolio of banks 
without a significant change in the average indebtedness per customer; i.e., banks’ loan 
book expanded without compromising borrowers’ payment capacity. The presence of 
these new customers also reduced the share of high valued loans, decreasing credit risk 
concentration of the overall portfolio.  
 
5Figure 1 - Interest rates
Note: The figure plots the evolution of pre-fixed rates of credit operations w ith nonearmarked
funds and time deposits, and the monetary policy interest rate. All of themare in annual terms, %




























































































































Moreover, the Central Bank implemented a new credit information system 
(called SCR), decreasing information asymmetries regarding borrowers, and new credit 
types were created, such as payroll-backed loans
4
 
, which reduced the risk profile of 
banks’ credit portfolio, as they have lower delinquency rates, decreasing institutions’ 
losses. All these factors, accompanied by some others, helped to reduce bank interest 
rates as well as spreads.  
As regards to credit volume, the reduction in the base rate produced a decrease 
in the return of many liquid assets. As a consequence, financial institutions gradually 
transferred their investments from these assets to credit operations so as to maintain 
their profitability. This transfer strongly expanded the volume of credit in the financial 
system. From 2001 to 2009, its value increased from 26.8% to 45% of the gross 
domestic product (GDP). In the same period, credit operations with nonearmarked funds 
rose from 15.5% to 30.4% of GDP. Along this process, the credit portfolio of banks 
grew at higher rates than the funding expansion, but not sufficiently to put a pressure, 
due to limited funding, on loan and funding rates, as can be seen in Figure 2. In 
4 Payroll-backed loans are personal loans with principal and interests payments automatically deducted 
from the borrowers’ payroll check. The borrowers can be salaried workers or retirees and, in practice, the 
automatic deduction turns future income into collateral. In January 2004, payroll-backed loans 
represented 34.3% of personal loans with pre-fixed interest rates. In December 2010, its proportion 
increased to 68.8%. 
6addition, the use of foreign funding or securitization is still low in Brazil. In June 2010, 
only 6.1% of the financial system’s  liabilities had a foreign counterparty  or were 
connected to currencies from other countries. 
 



























































































































The high liquidity of Brazilian banks and their good capitalization are two other 
factors that have allowed the expansion of the credit portfolio without pressuring 
interest rates. In December 2009, the ratio of liquid assets to total assets was 50%, 
compared to 30% in countries such as France, Sweden and Belgium, or to ratios lower 
than 15% in countries such as Portugal and United States. Besides this, unlike other 
countries, the securities portfolio of Brazilian banks consists mainly of public bonds, 
which are accepted by the Brazilian Central Bank in its interbank market operations and 
have an organized and liquid secondary market.  
 
The good capitalization of the financial system is due to an expansion in the 
capital basis that occurred in the last decade, through the issue of new capital and profit 
retention. As a consequence, the capital ratios of Brazilian banks have been kept at 
comfortable levels, exceeding standard requirements. In December 2009, the Basel ratio 
for the banking system was 18.6%, well above the 11% level required by Brazilian 
regulations. 
 
To conclude this section, the evolution of bank concentration is presented in 
Figure 3. It can be seen that between 2002 and 2003 there was an increase in 
concentration. This period was characterized by some acquisitions and reduction in the 
7number of institutions, in which banks sought new sources of revenue and demanded 
scale, to face the prospect of reduced earnings resulting from the downward trend in 
interest rates. After that, despite several acquisitions and financial system consolidation, 
changes in the dispersion of market shares in the financial system and the entry of new 
competitors decreased the market concentration. More recently, following the financial 
crises of 2008, there were some important bank acquisitions.  Nevertheless,  the 
characteristics of the recent deals seem to have mitigated possible anticompetitive 
effects (Banco Central do Brasil, 2010). 
 




























































































































Herfindahl index  
 
3 A brief review of the literature  
 
  Few studies have examined the interest rate pass-through in Brazil. The first of 
them is that by Alencar (2003), who found that the monetary policy rate changes lead to 
a less than one-for-one change of corporate loan rates in the short run, and to a complete 
pass-through to funding and retail loan rates. Besides this, he found differences in the 
pass-through across different bank lending rates. More recently, Castro and De Mello 
(2010) studied the asymmetry of the response of retail lending rates to monetary policy 
shocks and found evidence for asymmetric adjustment. 
 
  On the other hand, the international literature on the subject is extensive and 
many different approaches have been applied. Among the earlier papers, Hannan and 
8Berger (1991) studied the case of deposit interest rates and Kourelis and Cottarelli 
(1994)  examined  loan interest rates in an international context. Following these 
preliminary articles, to mention some papers, Sander and Kleimeier  (2002) and De 
Bondt (2002) analyzed the asymmetric adjustment of retail bank interest rates to 
monetary impulses, using European data; Kleimeier and Sander (2006) investigated the 
pass-through by differentiating between expected and unexpected monetary policy 
shocks; and De Graeve et al. (2007) and Gambacorta (2008) tested the existence of bank 
heterogeneity in the pass-through. The international literature usually finds that changes 
in bank interest rates are sluggish in the short run, but there is no consensus on a 
possible one-for-one pass-through in the long run. The papers that allow for asymmetric 
response on bank rates typically find evidence of asymmetries, while some papers find 
heterogeneity in the response of banks to monetary policy shocks. The literature usually 
compares bank rates with market rates of equal maturity to distinguish the pass-through 
of marginal costs from term structure effects of base rates, but there are some studies 
that compare bank rates with the monetary policy rate, such as the one by Kleimeier and 
Sander (2006). 
 
In addition to studies about the pass-through, in the last decade there has also 
been an effort to understand the determinants of interest rate spreads in Brazil. Among 
these studies, we can cite Afanasieff et al. (2002), Bignotto and Rodrigues (2006) and 
Oureiro et al. (2006), all of whom found that macroeconomic variables such as the 
inflation rate, risk premium and economic activity are relevant factors to explain the 
behavior of interest spreads. Moreover, microeconomic factors such as the default risk, 
interest-rate risk, administrative costs, liquidity level and banking service revenues have 
also  been  found to produce significant impacts on  the spread. More recently, the 
Brazilian  Central Bank developed an accounting decomposition of interest spreads 
(Koyama et al., 2008), which decomposes the banking spread among operational costs, 
loan default costs, reserve requirements, taxes, cross subsidies in credit lines and the 
cost of deposit insurance.  
 
One of the major contributions of the present paper is to find robust results 
concerning the impact of market concentration on bank loan interest rates. Some studies 
have attempted to examine the degree of competition in the Brazilian financial system 
and its influence on interest rates. Belaisch (2003), for example, concluded that the 
9Brazilian banking sector neither behaves as a cartel nor as perfectly competitive. On the 
other hand, Nakane et al.  (2006) found that even the Bertrand competition 
overestimated the observed degree of market power for both loans and time deposits in 
Brazil. Our results add some evidence corroborating the market power hypothesis. Since 
more on the international literature will be presented while discussing the results, we 




The scope of this paper is the Brazilian banking sector. The data comprises 
monthly interest rates from 63 banks during the period from January 2002 to November 
2009. These financial institutions account for more than 80% of the total assets of the 
Brazilian banking market. The interest rates apply to new operations, and interest rates 
on loans are pre-fixed rates of operations with nonearmarked funds. The panel of banks 
is a balanced panel
5. Interest rates on time deposits, total corporate loans, total retail 
loans and interest spreads
6
 
 are analyzed, and also of the following five loan products: 
vendor, working capital, personal loans, purchase of vehicles and purchase of other 
goods. A brief description of the last five loan categories can be found in the Appendix. 
The control variables are  divided into macroeconomic, market structure and 
bank-related variables (microeconomic characteristics). There are five macroeconomic 
variables: the monetary policy rate and its volatility, the inflation rate, real income and a 
control for international shocks. As a proxy for real income, we use the real average 
income of employed people (registered on the books  as opposed to workers in the 
informal economy), which is measured by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE). In addition, to check the robustness of some results, we use the Index 
of Economic Activity of the Central Bank of Brazil (IBC-Br) as another proxy for real 
income. The inflation rate is the Broad National Consumer Price Index (IPCA), which is 
the price index related to inflation targeting in the country, and we use the JP Morgan 
Emerging Markets Bond Index for Brazil (EMBI Brazil) to control for the international 
risk perception of  the country, which can  affect debt and funding instruments. The 
5 The choice of a balanced panel can generate a selection bias in the estimates, but has the advantage of 
presenting the behavior of banks that have had at least one retail or corporate business line throughout the 
whole period of the study. 
6 Interest spread is equal to the difference between the interest rates of total loans and time deposits. 
10monetary policy rate is the rate of the Special System of Clearance and Custody (Selic). 
A description of the calculation of its volatility can be found in the Appendix. We did 
not seasonally adjust the data. 
 
Regarding the bank-related controls, they consist of balance sheet data. The size 
indicator is the logarithm of total assets of each bank, liquidity is measured by cash 
deposits and securities over total assets, and the capitalization index is the excess capital 
over total assets, that is, the amount of capital that banks hold in excess of the minimum 
required to deal with prudential regulation standards. The advantage of this last measure 
is that it takes into account the risk of the bank’s portfolio (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 
2004). There are also two measures of inefficiency. The first one is the ratio of the total 
cost that the bank incurs to collect deposits over the total volume of these deposits 
(funding efficiency), which is used in the loan regressions. The second is employed in 
the time-deposit and interest spread regressions and is represented by the ratio of total 
loans and deposits to the number of branches (management efficiency). Besides these, 
we also use as a control the aggregate loan default rate (the percentage of the credit 
portfolio in arrears by more than 15 days), and we control for the proportion of payroll-
backed loans in retail loans, which may influence overall retail rates. 
 
The market structure is controlled by the Herfindahl index, bank concentration 
in relation to assets, and we use as a robustness check the ratio between the assets of the 
three largest banks divided by the total assets in our banking sample. These are popular 
measures of concentration in the banking literature (Alegria and Schaeck, 2008).  
 
Recent studies on the determination of interest rates have usually been based on 
a specification of error correction, or variants of this technique (e.g., Kleimeier and 
Sander, 2006; De Graeve et al., 2007; Gambacorta, 2008). In this work we  follow 
another approach, since unit root tests for the different variables examined suggest that 
the variables are stationary, except for the management inefficiency variable. These 
tests are presented in Table 1, which also shows  some descriptive statistics of the 
variables used in the econometric estimations.  
 
11starting point of our analysis is the estimation of the pass-through interest rate of five 
loan products. To achieve this objective, we estimate regressions of the following form: 
 





j t , k j k t , k i i i ε + ΓΦ + β + α + µ = ∑ ∑ − −                                      (1) 
 
where k = 1 …, N (k = banks) and t = 1,…, T (t = periods).  t , k i  is the bank interest rate, 
M
t i  is the monetary policy rate,  t Φ  is a vector that includes seasonal dummies and a 
dummy that captures the effect of the crisis of September 2008
7
t , k ε , and   is the random 
error. Eleven lags of each variable were included in the unrestricted model, and non-
significant terms were then excluded. The model allows for fixed effects across banks, 
as indicated by the intercept  k µ
8
 










                                                       (2) 
 
where  0 β  represents the immediate pass-through.  
 
The model was estimated using the difference GMM estimator suggested by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). In the choice of lags, we kept those that were significant to 
at least 10%, and the seasonal dummies were retained even if not significant up to this 
value. In the choice of the instruments, the dummies and the variables lagged two or 
more periods were treated as exogenous. The second lag of the remaining variables was 
used to instrument these remaining regressors. In the estimations, we found no evidence 
of serial correlation, and the Hansen test did not reject the validity of the instruments. 
 
Table 2 presents the main results by loan product. The complete estimation can 
be found in Table A1 of the Appendix.
9
7 This crisis variable is a step dummy that takes the unit value from September 2008 on, and zero in 
previous periods. 
 Our estimates for the short- and long-term pass-
through are positive and significant at the usual levels. The hypothesis of the long-run 
8 We chose to use a model with fixed rather than random effects because that is the usual treatment in the 
literature (e.g., see De Graeve et al., 2007 and Gambacorta, 2008). 
9 To save space, the coefficients on seasonal dummies are not reported in the estimations presented in the 
Appendix. 
13are large differences in the evolution of corporate and retail rates, it seems important to 
identify the contributory factors to this phenomenon. Therefore, the regressions that 
follow consider as the dependent variable interest rates of total corporate and retail 
loans, and also of time deposits, and the interest spread. Here we modify Model (1) 
slightly to: 
 
t , k t
n l
l t , n l , n
j
j t , k j k t , k Y i i ε + ΓΦ + κ + α + µ = ∑∑ ∑ − −         (3) 
 
where Y is a vector of control variables, including the monetary policy rate, and now  t Φ  
includes  only seasonal dummies
10
 
.  Now  six lags of the explanatory variable are 
included in the unrestricted model, and non-significant terms are excluded. The long-












                (4) 
 
which is presented in Tables 3 and 4. The first part of each of these tables presents the 
effects of macroeconomic variables; the second part shows the influence of bank-related 
variables; the third part exhibits the  effects of the market structure; the fourth part 
presents the immediate monetary policy effect on bank interest rates; and the last part 
presents Wald tests for unitary pass-through and two specification tests. Besides these, 
our benchmark equation uses the Herfindhal index, the real average income of 
employed people (from IBGE) and monthly data from January 2002 to November 2009. 
On the other hand, our robustness checks use as an alternative market concentration the 
three-bank concentration index, as an alternative income proxy the Index of Economic 
Activity of the Central Bank of Brazil (IBC-Br), and as an alternative sample period 
data from January 2003 to November 2009. Table 3 also presents  an estimation 
10 The dummy for the September 2008 crises is not included because Y contains an index that takes into 
account international shocks (EMBI Brazil). 




to assess its importance to explain the behavior of retail interest rates. 
  None of the estimations presented  show any sign of miss-specification.  As 
expected, monetary policy interest rate influences loan and time deposits rates 
significantly, both in the long and short term (the immediate pass-through). The Wald 
tests show that we cannot reject that banks fully adjust the short-term lending rate to a 
change in the base rate, but this hypothesis is rejected for time deposits. The pass-
through is complete in the long run for corporate loans (the null hypothesis of a unitary 
coefficient is not rejected), and the robustness results do not allow us to conclude if it is 
greater than or equal to one in the case of retail loans (a similar result for Canada was 
found by Moazzami, 1999). On the other hand, there is some evidence in favor of time 
deposit interest rate stickiness, even in the long run. This stickiness may be related to a 
lack of competition in the bank funding market. As regards the interest spread, we found 
evidence that the monetary policy rate has an immediate impact on it, but it seems that 
this effect vanishes in the long run. To contrast our results with some international 
evidence, we can mention Berstein and Fuentes (2004), who found pass-through values 
between 0.70 and 0.88 for the Chilean loan market, and Gambacorta (2008), who 
obtained a short-term value around 0.45, both for loan and time deposits, in Italy. Like 
our results, Gambacorta detected that the long-run effect of changes in the policy rate 
was less than one for time deposits, but complete for loans. 
 
Regarding the volatility of monetary policy, our results show that it is positively 
(negatively) correlated with the loan (time deposit) rate. This can be explained by a 
context where banks, in order to maximize their expected utility (wealth), are risk 
averse to fluctuations in interest rates. Since most of the credit (from nonearmarked 
funds) from banks is contracted at a pre-fixed rate in Brazil, this risk may be relevant, as 
shown by our results. In such a case, the models of  Ho and Saunders (1981) and 
11 This variable is equal to the proportion of payroll backed loans in retail loans from February 2004 on, 
and zero in previous periods due to data availability constraints. This constraint does not seem to be 
relevant, because the volume of payroll loans was low before January 2004, when a change in the law 
(Law 10.820/03, December 2003) allowed such loans to be made to salaried workers in the private sector 
and retirees instead of just government personnel. 
16Maudos and Guevara (2004) indicate there is a positive correlation between interest rate 




In principle, as stated by  Gambacorta (2008), better economic conditions 
increase the expected net value of investment projects, increasing the demand for loans 
and also bank demand for funds. From this perspective, the interest rates on loans and 
time deposits would depend positively on the level of economic activity.
13
 
 On the other 
hand, an increase in national income boosts the funding sources of banks, diminishing 
deposit interest rates and so loan rates. Which of these effects will prevail depends on 
production opportunities, individual preferences, etc. Our results found robust evidence 
that income growth is associated with higher loan rates and spreads in Brazil, but they 
are inconclusive regarding funding rates. As expected, since we are working with 
nominal interest rates, the effect of inflation is positive and significant for both interest 
rates. The interest spread is also positively influenced by inflation. With respect to the 
international risk perception, which can affect debt and funding instruments (EMBI 
Brazil), Tables 3 and 4 present significant and robust results that a higher risk 
perception is associated with higher interest rates and spreads. 
Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Kishan and Opiela (2000) found evidence that 
small banks with low liquidity and low capitalization charge higher rates for loans and 
are more vulnerable to monetary shocks. This is because, given that the market 
considers them more risky, they pay a higher premium on their funding and 
consequently tend to have higher interest rates. By being more susceptible to 
asymmetric information regarding the value of their assets, these banks are less able to 
protect their credit relationships in the case of monetary shocks. Additionally, banks 
must maintain a certain level of capital in terms of their risk assets, implying that their 
ability to expand their lending depends on their capitalization. 
 
12 Curiously, even though the individual results on loan and time deposit rates strongly indicate such 
effect, the interest spread result is not robust. One possible explanation is that the loan and time deposit 
rates are calculated from the granting of new credit and funding operations, while the interest spread, 
following the Brazilian Central Bank’s standards, is measured using loan rates on the total volume of 
credit, having greater inertia, as can be seen in the estimations in the Appendix. As a consequence, it 
tends to be less sensitive to changes in the explanatory variables. 
13 Besides this, Melitz and Pardue (1973) presented a theoretical argument to the effect that increases in 
income are associated with higher loan rates. 
17Table 4 shows that better capitalized banks have both lower interest spreads and 
time deposit rates. On the other hand, there is no evidence in Table 3 that capitalization 
influences bank pricing policies on the loan side. Liquid banks have lower interest rates 
on corporate loans, and there is some evidence that they also present lower spreads. This 
last  result is interesting because since  reserve requirements are  high in Brazil in 
comparison to other countries, if a change in these requirements affects liquidity (see 
Gray, 2011), it will also affect corporate rates and the spread. An additional result 
presented in Table 3 is that smaller banks also are shown to have lower interest rates on 
corporate credit.  
 
Another determinant of banks' behavior in setting interest rates is the degree of 
competition in the credit market. This may be a relevant factor in the Brazilian case, 
since Chang et al. (2008) presented evidence that around 10% of banks in the Brazilian 
financial system made nearly all the bank loans. Nonetheless, Berger and Hannan 
(1989) discerned two possible impacts of banking concentration on bank pricing. On the 
one hand, a more concentrated banking sector tends to operate in an oligopolistic 
manner, charging higher interest rates. On the other, the higher concentration may be 
related to the fact that the most efficient banks have increased their market share, 
leading to lower loan rates. Our findings indicate that market concentration has a 
significant and robust positive effect on loan rates and interest spreads. This result 
corroborates the market power hypothesis of Berger (1995), by which banks with large 
market share are associated with higher loan rates and interest spreads. 
 
The degree of banks’ operational inefficiency and the default rate of their credit 
portfolio represent a cost to the bank, so it is also expected that these variables influence 
banks’ pricing decisions. In our estimations, more efficient banks have lower corporate 
loan rates and higher time deposit rates. In addition, higher delinquency ratios are 
associated with higher loan rates and interest spreads.  
 
 
18As shown in Figure 1, the decline of retail loan rates in Brazil has been much 
more pronounced than observed in the corporate segment. Some of the possible 
explanations for this behavior can be the increase in the proportion of payroll-backed 
loans in retail loans, and the greater effect of the monetary policy rate on retail rates, as 
can be seen in the point estimates of Table 3. Additionally, our results show that 
corporate rates are much more sensitive to bank related variables than retail rates. One 
possible explanation is that since in corporate banking there are more alternative credit 
providers and entry barriers on lending are lower, there is greater competition in 
corporate business lines (World Bank, 2007). So competition may be driving the 
importance of bank related variables as determinants of corporate rates. But this is a 
conjecture. 
 
6 Concluding remarks 
 
Knowing the behavior of bank interest rates is relevant to conducting monetary 
policy and also to designing public policies. With this in mind, this article sought to 
examine how banks set their interest rates. In the estimations presented, we found a 
complete transmission of the monetary policy rate to loan rates in the long term, 
demonstrating the effectiveness of this policy. On the other hand, in the estimations for 
time deposit and short-run loan rates, the results indicated some degree of rigidity, 
especially for loan products with higher average maturity. 
 
Among the many results, we  found a significant and robust impact of 
international risk perception, as proxied by the  EMBI Brazil, on interest rates  and 
spreads. Market concentration was also found to have a significant and robust positive 
effect on loan rates and interest spreads. This last result corroborates the market power 
hypothesis of Berger (1995), according to which banks with large market share charge 
higher loan rates and interest spreads. 
 
This study also confirmed the importance of examining different markets in the 
Brazilian banking sector, since pricing policies can vary substantially depending on the 
market. One key finding of the paper is that corporate business rates seem to be more 
sensitive to bank related variables, such as liquidity and efficiency, than retail rates. 
23Also, the increasing importance of payroll-backed loans seems to be influencing the 
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26Appendix  
 
A.1 Description of some variables 
 
Working capital is a line of credit with a maturity greater than thirty days, 
intended to finance the operational activities of enterprises. It requires collateral. 
 
Vendor is a line of credit that allows a company to receive cash immediately 
and sell to customers on time payments.  
 
Purchase  of vehicles  covers purchase of cars, trucks and motorcycles by 
individuals. 
 
Purchase of other goods is a line of credit for the purchase of goods other than 
vehicles, and requires collateral, usually the good itself. 
 
Personal loan is a line of credit to individuals in which the credit is not tied to 
the purchase of a specific good or service. 
 
The volatility of interest rates was estimated from daily data. It was calculated 
as follows: 
 











where “ d i ” represents the base rate on day d of period t, “ 1 − d i ” is the same rate on day d-
1, and n is the number of observations. The volatility of the monetary policy rate in 


















Further information from Tables 2, 3 and 4 of the text is presented here in Tables 
A1, A2 and A3. 
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